








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Response of the Presenter to Commentators
M.C.: Professor Mizobe We are three minutes behind schedule so let me open the afternoon session for discus-
sion at this point. For the afternoon session, I will be your moderator. My name is Mizobe Hideaki, and I am a 
professor in the Law Department of Kyoto Sangyo University. I also engage in research at the Institute for World 
Affairs. It is a great pleasure to be your moderator this afternoon.
Like this morning’s session, Miss Yamada Eriko will be the main interpreter, but Professor Brunkhorst and 
Mr. Fini will each have an interpreter sitting next to them. We have until 5:45 p.m. for the free discussion. It is 
now 3:45 p.m.; fi rst let us hear the responses of our keynote speakers, Professor Brunkhorst and Mr. Fini, to the 
speeches of our six commentators this morning. Let us fi rst listen to Professor Brunkhorst.
Prof. Hauke Brunkhorst Thank you very much. I start with Bradley Edmister whom I fi rst have to thank for 
his excellent paper. I agree with most of it. In particular in respect to the important and indispensable function of 
the nation state for the implementation and enforcement of national and international private and public law. The 
democratic and republican nation and state is no longer the one and only center of global politics and law, but still 
one of the most important global organizations. The state itself has become a global organization because today 
there is no square mile of land any longer that is not the territory of an independent state, even if it is a failed 
state. The moment a state decays is the moment when the international community starts to introduce state build-
ing programs. The price the state had to pay for its globalization was its integration into a system of different con-
stitutional regimes of state and non-state actors which we now call the international community. As an integral 
part of a system of national, inter-, trans- and supra-national organizations the state has lost its sovereignty. State 
power today depends deeply on the (primarily legislative and judicial) power of organizations between, beyond 
and above the nation-state. These organizations regulate the global functional systems, and in particular the global 
economy.
Yet, I am not as optimistic as Bradley about the impacts of free markets. Economic freedom was one of the 
great advances of modernity, but economic freedom never ever leads automatically or necessarily to democratic 
freedom. Democratic freedom needs not only a regulation (and there is nothing like de-regulation because every 
de-regulation needs immediately re-regulation) of the economy but its constitutionalization in a way that ensures 
equal chances and a certain amount of welfare for everybody. The basic problem with the global economy is that 
neither the states nor the other existing global organizations and emerging constitutional regimes any longer have 
the power of the now decaying democratic social welfare state to keep the economy, which has become global 
turbo-capitalism, under strong constitutional control. Different from the old days of state-embedded late-capital-
ism with its state-embedded markets we now have a global turbo-capitalism with market embedded states, and an 
economy of market embedded states is a regulated but deconstitutionalized economy. Deconstitutionalization has 
winners and losers. The winners are the upper middle classes (and higher), the losers are a growing number of 
people who are excluded from access to all basic social systems. They are excluded from work, consumerism, 
Free Discussion 231
citizenship, schools, law, political participation and so on. Up to now the losers of the deconstitutionalized global 
economy are the under-classes and more and more the lower middle classes, and those who live in the periphery, 
in the Banlieu of the globe. For them the proponents of neo-liberalism can only offer the empty promise of a 
 glorious future for everybody. Whereas economic freedom cannot offer more than an empty promise to the losers 
of the private use of economic freedom, democratic freedom gives political means into the hand of the losers of 
economic progress to change their social situation. To be sure, we need both, democratic and economic freedom, 
but economic freedom alone is far away from presupposing democracy. Economic freedom fi ts as well to democ-
racy as it fi tted to Hitlers Third Reich, to Pinochets Chile, or to the communist party’s regime in China.
Bradley’s is focusing on a private law, and I agree with most what he said in this respect. But Bradley some-
time misses my very point. I guess we have to draw a further sharp distinction between international private law 
and international public law. International private law—Bradley said, and I agree—is concerned primarily with 
courts and contracts. In private law, no parliament makes binding decisions, in private law individual persons, 
fi rms or other legal actors agree voluntarily in some reciprocally binding rules. They are the original creators of 
all private law. It’s nothing wrong with that, as long as both contradicting parties have equal chances to say no. 
The necessary condition of equal freedom in private law is that both partners have a real alternative if they say 
no. Just this condition is, for example, never ever automatically fulfi lled on labor markets, and only civil courts 
and dispute settlement bodies are not enough to secure the necessary conditions for an equal use of private auton-
omy. Courts can control but not create and implement it because they are not a legislator. Therefore the basic situ-
ation in global markets and private law regimes regulariy means unequal freedom of private actors. Particularly 
in so called ‘Third World’ or in ‘threshold countries’ poor people are often without suffi cient support by strong 
unions, without suffi cient judicial remedies to defend themselves, without suffi cient social security etc. Here the 
people who need labor to survive, have no chance to say “no”—but their employee employer usually can say “no” 
because there are simply enough people looking for a job. In all these cases equal freedom of markets is fi ction. 
This fi ctive character of private freedom only can be overcome through public legislation, and public legislation 
only works if there are suffi cient (administrative) means to implement all public legislation.
The very problem with the effective globalization of markets, economic freedom and private law regimes is 
that there are not enough constitutional means to control the development of markets and to implement the basic 
conditions of equal use of economic freedom within global private law regimes. In a world of market embedded 
states the constitutional regimes of the states together with the new post-national constitutional regimes like the 
EU-, the WTO- or the UN-/SC-system are able to control major threats to peace all over the world, to control and 
implement human rights regimes with growing impacts on despotic regimes or failed states areas, to prevent 
major human rights violations and genocides. Global constitutional regimes which are public are already strong 
enough to implement the famous Durkheimian pre-contractual conditions of contracts, and to re-regulate the 
global economy. Global constitutionalism today even is strong enough to keep the strongest super-powers like 
that of the United States a super-power within international rule of law. In particular you can observe this in the 
case of Guantamano, where the US-supreme court now has decided that the US have to keep the Geneva Conven-
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tion even in Guantamano and in other all cases of terrorism everywhere in the world. The main advance of global 
constitutionalism is that there is no longer imperialism which (like a classical sovereign king or state) stands at 
the border or beyond the rule of law. Today there exists only hegemony, and hegemony different from imperialism 
has to operate always within the rule of law. This does not mean that there are no longer illegal acts which are not 
sanctioned, especially if they are performed by the strongest powers, but it means that there are no longer extra-
legal acts of the sovereign power of a given legal community. But (different from the old days of state-embedded 
and suffi ciently constitutionalized late capitalism) the existing global constitutional regimes are not strong enough 
to enforce democratic equality against the hegemony of particular ruling powers and particular ruling classes, and 
the existing global constitutional regimes are not strong enough to control and implement the basic conditions for 
the equal use of private and public autonomy. One of the main causes of the weakness of international and trans-
national and even of supranantional law is that the process of international constitutionalization at was also a proc-
ess of de-formalizing international law. International law today, private and public, is in a great area of fi elds soft 
law emerging from informal appointments, meetings and consultations. Informal power (for example that of the 
Basel Bank Commission or the European Council or the G8) cannot be changed by legislation and cannot be con-
trolled effectively by courts, and therefore informally created soft law has a strong impact not only on inter-
national but also and in particular on national legislation and jurisdiction, and through de-formalized soft law 
democratic procedures often are bypassed and marginalized by executive and hegemonic powers. To sum it up: 
What is so perverse with the present global economy and politics is fi rst that the price of the progressive explo-
sion of all productive forces of economic communication is the destruction of the basic conditions of equal free-
dom for everybody that is prescribed by all national and even by all inter-, trans and supranational constitutions. 
What secondly is perverse with the present global order is that without hegemony (in particular of the United 
States) there can be reached no legal peace, and no effective prevention of major human rights violations, but at 
the same time just this human rights and peace keeping hegemony undermines the conditions of possibility of 
democratic self rule all over the globe. The effect of both faults of international public law and global constitu-
tionalism is the emergence of a new transnational ruling class, whose ruler-ship Craig Calhoune nicely has called 
the cosmopolitism of the few.
Now, very briefl y, let me make two remarks on the paper of Professor Mishima. I agree in particular with 
what he said about the role of the past, and (as I already said) I think he is completely right to emphasize that 
there will be no stable peace and no future for a greater East Asian democratic community if the distinction 
between those who were the victims and those who were the perpetrators during the Second World War is 
repressed and kept unspoken, and in particular if the guilt is not acknowledged by the country or countiries where 
the perpetrators came from. But professor Mishima also posed the important (and old Kantian) question if in the 
end any cosmopolitan order which can be reached beyond the nation state is a non-democratic order. Even further 
(with Marx) he faces us with the question, how we can cope with the facticity of power and hegemony, and with 
the dominance of the hegemonic power within the rule of law. Isn’t it illusionary to believe here in the force of 
law? One must take this question very serious, because even if any law is better than no law, law is not always, as 
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Gustav Radbruch once said, in favor of the ruled classes but as well, as Phillip Allot (and Marx) says, in favor of 
the ruling classes. This is true. Law has, as Habermas states at the beginning of his book on legal philosophy, a 
Janus face. It is, as Martti Koskenniemi would say, two opposing characters in one person, Mr. Jekyll and Mr. 
Hyde. But during the fi ght of social classes and groups about law there are chances for the ruled classes and 
 marginalized groups to change the law, to formalize it, to bind the ruling classes through formal rules which are 
equal for everybody. The hegemonic powers of today must not keep this power, and the structure of hegemony 
can be changed (but must not) in the direction of more egalitarianism and more democratic freedom. Radical 
reformism (and sometimes even a revolution) is not a priori without chances.
Now, my time is over, and I must apologize that I cannot answer the other commentators with whom I 
mostly agree. But I guess, some of the most important points I have mentioned already in my far too long talk.
M.C.: Professor Mizobe Now, let us listen to the response of Mr. Fini. (Applause)
Mr. Massimo Fini I will mainly respond to Professor Mishima’s and Mr. Bradley Edmister’s arguments, not 
because the others are less interesting- they are just as engaging because of the unique perspectives they have 
brought to the elucidation of today’s topic, but because these two commentators have raised the most strident 
 criticism of my position. Professor Mishima accuses me of being a pessimist, a conservative and a nostalgic, but I 
beg to disagree.
There is absolutely nothing that I would like to keep in the present model for development. But I am not 
turning back to the past; I look into the future. I use the past to demystify the present, its deception, and its 
 illusions, which are more or less true and lay bare its untruthfulness. In my opinion, the conservatives are those 
left-wingers or right-wingers, liberals and Marxists who insist on sticking to the present model for development 
at all costs even though in different ways. They think that they are the pinnacles of modernity, are self-confi dent, 
and actually think that since they have been born into and raised in modernity, their success has made them the 
top of modernity. Unfortunately, in the last two and a half centuries since it started in the 18th century in the indus-
trial revolution in England, modernity has aged quite a lot. Modernity’s ethos is gone; it is no longer modern. It 
has aged more because in the past two centuries, history has reached a speed unknown before to mankind. For 
this reason, left-wing and right-wing stances, liberalism and Marxism in their various forms cannot respond any-
more to the profound needs of contemporary man.
Two centuries and a half ago, we got on a train that seemed to be extraordinary, with a shining locomotive 
that should have brought us happiness. This hasn’t happened. The questions before us today are not how to better 
place passengers on this train anymore; they have changed. Firstly, “Where is the train going?” Secondly, “Do the 
pilots of this shining locomotive, or those who fl atter themselves in driving it, still have control over it?” “Has the 
train run out of control?” “Are we still able to choose the direction, the speed and a different destination for this 
train?” Or, instead, do the rails chosen two and a half centuries ago force us inevitably to go in a direction we 
cannot change, at a speed we cannot control, run continuously at an increasing speed towards the inevitable catas-
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trophe?” Let me explain why a catastrophe is an inevitable consequence of a system that is based on exponential 
growth (as I pointed out in my presentation, exponential growth exists only in mathematics, and not in the natural 
world); if we reach the point of exponential growth, then, there will be catastrophe. The fundamental question 
then becomes, “Two and a half centuries ago, did we get on the right train?” This is the central point of my 
inquiry.
The second counter-argument of Professor Mishima says that not all of the humanitarian interventions had a 
hidden political and economic agenda, but most of them were carried out with the best intentions. This is abso-
lutely true. Precisely, it comes to prove my point, which is that we in the West are convinced, truly convinced, 
that we represent the Good; we are convinced our values are universal, that they are shared by all peoples, cul-
tures, and societies, even if their lived histories and traditions are completely different from ours. What is scary is 
not malice, but rather good faith. You can always unmask bad faith. On the other hand, good faith is unfading and 
self-confi dent, and for this  reason, it goes on calmly existing against the test of time. Unfortunately, the past 
teaches us that not only the roads to hell but also the paths of human vicissitudes are paved with good intentions.
On the third point of Professor Mishima’s arguments, there may be a misunderstanding. He points out that I 
blame Judaeo-Christian thought, and especially Christian thought, for being totalitarian thought. It is not exactly 
what I mean. I argue that in Christianity, in the notion of evangelization, there is not only a need to spread the 
gospel, which is legitimate, but there is also the pretence of converting everyone to it. Here lies the core of the 
totalitarianism in the West at an initial stage. This is the “obscure vice”, for which I have named my book — 
which has been really successful in Italy — for its characterization of the whole of Western history. The reduction 
of everything into one single reality is what is implied in the book. It is clear that today’s western totalitarianism 
is not a religious one, especially in Europe, because nothing, or very little, of religion, and even less of Christian-
ity, is left in Europe. It is a secular totalitarianism, that wants to persuade everybody, with good or bad manners, 
almost always with bad ones, of the validity of its values, its culture, its own “way of life” and, above all, its eco-
nomic system, that cannot perceive what is different from itself.
With the same explanation, I would like to address Mr. Edminster’s argument that says that it is not true that 
globalization has come to an end, and that only 72 countries in the world thus far, have a free market. This is true, 
but it is also true that we are trying in every way possible to standardize the other 120 countries to the West. I 
would say that an emblematic example is Afghanistan. Afghanistan, governed by Mullah Omar, received, I’m 
sorry to say, an endorsement by the majority of the population, who not only did not want to Americanize itself, 
but absolutely, did not want to modernize itself. And it has been wiped out using bombs and depleted uranium, 
under the pretext of looking for and fi nding a man, Bin Laden, who in the end has not been found. In Mullah 
Omar’s and the Taliban’s stead, who used to represent a signifi cant part of their country, a consultant of UNOCAL 
(a petroleum company which has its headquarters in California—translator’s note) has been placed, who is a 
 person faithful to the Americans, as Karzai is. We, as westerners, have deprived the Afghans of their history by 
imposing our own history on them.
Finally, let me say that I am glad to be in agreement on some issues, on many issues, with Professor Zhu. I 
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believe this convergence of opinions among intellectuals belonging to very different cultures as the Chinese and 
Italians are, or the Europeans in general (in this case Italian, as I am Italian), must be matter of refl ection for those 
who support or advocate the present model of development and are pulling us — against our and their will — to 
the tragedy, while swinging the sword, in the convirtion that they represent “Good”.
Thank you very much.
Panel Discussion
M.C.: Professor Mizobe I am sure that the six commentators would like to respond to the speeches of the 
 keynote speakers just now. However, we would like to call on Mr. Edmister for his comments on the ideas of the 
speakers.
Mr. Edmister In refl ecting on the two speeches that we heard and responding in broad brush strokes, I think 
that professor Brunkhorst and I are speaking within the same general framework and share a great many ideas, 
and that we are looking for answers regarding the right way to create an international society. Whereas Mr. Fini’s 
vision of the appropriate world order is more like an alternative, and we are less engaging each other directly as 
we are setting side-by-side two alternative pictures.
In response to Mr. Fini, well, what I sensed from Mr.Fini is that he looks at globalization and international-
ization of society, and he sees some sort of cultural authenticity which is being lost in standardization—that the 
infl uence of America as well as other countries on Italy is a broad standardization of Europe. He has presented an 
alternative where European society—Italian society—deals with this destruction of Italian cultural authenticity by 
closing Europe, by becoming inward focused and resisting globalization. My main fear, or question, is that, as he 
pointed out, the Italian people themselves have international, external aspirations. They have adapted European 
and American ways into their lifestyle. They want “americanata”. They want progress. They want modernity at 
some level. I wonder how you suppress the external ambitions, the external and international aspirations—the 
cosmopolitan aspirations—of the Italian people in creating a closed society that rejects globalization, unless it is 
through some new form of government. And it couldn’t possibly be a government that supports freedom, free 
expression and democracy, because any such form of government will necessarily be faced with the problem of 
how to suppress or contain these external aspirations. My fear is that democracy and freedom could be destroyed 
by adapting this model of a closed Europe supported by Mr. Fini.
I was very impressed with professor Brunkhorst’s comments in relation to my speech. I sensed that we both 
share common values of democracy and modernism as a source of progress. We don’t have the same pessimistic 
outlook as Mr. Fini. Where we seem to differ is in the appropriate structures to be used in creating an international 
society. Mr. Brunkhorst supports the expansion of international formal law. I think professor Brunkhorst is abso-
lutely correct that “soft law”, the sorts of informal international bodies that have grown up over the years in pub-
lic international law, are to some degree anti-democratic. I think it’s true that formal law restrains people because 
it is absolute. The United States certainly does prefer multilateral forums that are fl exible and “soft”, because, in 
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a changing world, it fi nds that fl exibility is useful. And formal law is absolutely restraining. We see that in the 
security council where there are formal restraints. I wonder, though, whether within Europe, formal law to some 
degree has been successful because the societies are democratic. They share common values. They share eco-
nomic prosperity and share a common sense of social welfare in the state and the way it should work. They have 
been able to create formal laws that are widely assented to. To some degree, then, when we create formal laws, 
the question is then who creates them? Who should implement those structures? Who should create the formal 
law? And can a formal legal structure be democratic? I think that’s important. I wonder if some of the recent 
opposition of Europeans to the European Union constitution has been that there may be a frustration with techno-
crats, the bureaucracy, and a sense that the formal law of the EU has not been appropriately democratic or respon-
sive.
So my skepticism, which I expressed in my own paper, is that if we try to impose formal law too early in the 
transnational sphere, it will have to be introduced as a practical matter through the same kinds of detached institu-
tions that are currently engaged in the “soft law” dialogue. I wonder if those institutions can be fully democratic 
and really create a formal law that is empowered by some sort of relation to democratic principles. And that’s 
why I suggest that private law has been successful in its more contractual, ad hoc use of national legal structures 
and national legal systems to develop a very creative free market of ideas. I suggested that activity in the transna-
tional sphere is already appropriately addressed by the necessary entanglement of transnational structures and 
functional global systems with national legal structures, and that people do retain power over the transnational 
sphere even without creating international formal law.
M.C.: Professor Mizobe Thank you very much. I think that our six commentators have counter-arguments to 
express, let us call on them one by one. At this point, we will give the fl oor to Professor Zhu Jianrong.
Professor Zhu Jianrong Yes, I would like to give my comments on the relationship between the EU and East 
Asia. In considering the future of East Asia, the relevant question is, to what extent should we learn from the EU? 
The answer to this question is clear; East Asia has a lot to learn not only from the EU but also from America and 
other parts of the world. I am not suggesting that we should imitate the EU and others, but that we should fi nd 
some viable feature that is rooted in East Asian culture and based on that, build a sustainable future for East Asia 
I think that the backbone of the European community, besides its economic and other forms of intercourse, is 
their shared religious cultural tradition. In addition, comparatively speaking, the closeness of the economic and 
social development of the EU member countries has facilitated their integration. If East Asia is viewed in terms 
of religion, and stage of development, it is a region that is defi ned by pluralism.
This region has all the religions of the world and the countries vary from Japan, which belongs to the devel-
oped world, to countries that are lagging behind in development. I think that discovering in haste a common char-
acteristic and equality to serve as a binding element in the integration of East Asian countries is not possible. 
There is, however, a need to defi ne this East Asian special cultural trait that should be developed as East Asia 
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attempts to go through the process of regional integration. But fi rst, there is a need to address issues of regional 
economic development, the guarantee of basic human rights to all citizens, the need to raise the standard of edu-
cation, and cooperation to solve economic problems across borders.
It is beyond question that countries in East Asia, including China, must seek democratization; now with 
China’s economic reform, and its route to liberalization being extended, then perhaps, after 15 or 20 years, 
democratization will come to China as a nation. At present in China, the population of the middle class is 
 estimated to be between four hundred million to fi ve hundred million. When the time comes that the number of 
people who are considered middle class will exceed half of the Chinese population, then it is clear from the 
examples of Korea, Taiwan and Southeast Asia that middle class dominance will bring about democratization. 
What I am emphasizing is the danger of the rush to democratization; it is a fact that democratization does not 
solve all problems and it is not good for fundamental problems to remain unsolved. The majority of the Chinese 
desire a country similar to America, Japan and Europe, but they don’t want to become like Russia and India. In 
national politics, Russia is practicing democracy. However, within the system, a mechanism to completely stamp 
out the vestiges of dictatorship is still not in place. In addition, the extent to which the mafi a has obstructed the 
institutionalization of a market economy in Russia is something to worry about. It is said that India is the world’s 
largest democracy, but the caste system wherein Indians born into it are treated unequal has not been abolished. I 
am not advocating keeping the current state of affairs in China, but that to reach democratization, it is necessary 
to follow a process and a sequential path. The economic development of a country, the improvement of the 
 people’s standard of living and the improvement of education are like the foundation of a house that must be set 
fi rst. And then, the roof, which is democracy, and which will support the pillars of the house, must be built. Sub-
sequently, the mechanism for constitutional government, market economy, competition, the guarantee of the rule 
of law and an equal distribution of wealth will then be established. Currently, China is still halfway through the 
process and most of these democratic imperatives are still nonexistent. I think that to build a true democracy in 
Russia, India, and China, and in many countries in Latin America, a solid ground and strong foundation must be 
completed at the outset. In this regard, Asia will fi rst strengthen the foundational elements from now on to reach 
the ideal state of democratization. Asia has another merit that can work to its advantage. In comparison with 
Europe, there is magnanimity towards other cultures and religions; there is a mutual co-existence of different cul-
tural and religious traditions. Perhaps, it can even be said that there is more tolerance in the region than there is in 
America and Europe. In facing the future, East Asian countries do not aim for standardization, but based on their 
emphasis on economic development, their varying attempts to guarantee limited human rights and their respect 
for each other’s culture, they can forge a common identity. In this process, using European equality, American 
dynamism and Asian magnanimity as foundation, the future of the East Asian community can be sought.
M.C.: Professor Mizobe Thank you very much. May we now please listen to Professor Mishima.
Professor Mishima Kenichi First, what I would like to bring up is the fact that democracy and the free market 
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economy, or capitalism, have always had a tense and complementary relationship. They are not the same thing. 
There is also a confl ict between these two concepts and also a point of cooperative fusion. This is easily under-
stood if we look at pre-war Japan and present-day China. In both cases, capitalism has prospered or is propering, 
but we cannot call them a democracy. We cannot say that Mitsui, Sumitomo, Mitsubishi desired democracy then.
In the same regard, one case we should mention was Europe’s aspiration to be a democratic nation like 
America. This was especially true in the 18th and 19th centuries. The common image portraying those who 
im migrated to the New World as those fi nancially ruined and hungry is only a half-truth. Immigrants to America 
harbored dreams of democracy. Of course, there were many who went to America to stave off hunger, but the 
important thing is that there were immigrants of exceptional intelligence and ability who made the choice to 
leave Europe and head for America in the hope of establishing a new democracy. Goethe had glorifi ed America. 
America was a wonderful country. It had no old castles and ruins whatsoever. “I would like to live in such a coun-
try myself”, he said. Even gloomy Kafka was an avid reader of “The Leaves of Grass”, a collection of poems by 
Walt Whitman. In this vein, it was thought that America was a great country, in other words, democracy (freedom 
and equality of rights) and prosperity were connected. Furthermore, after the war, it was perceived that the reason 
why Europe had done so well was because of the introduction of American democracy into Germany. Europe 
learned from America. Japan also has learned from America. We owe a lot to America.
However, the actual America has changed after that, and we can no longer say that capitalism and democ-
racy have coexisted well. Domestically, there is an extreme gap in wealth among Americans and even if we look 
at the elections, we cannot deem the outcome as a result of freedom of speech. The most extreme example is the 
American foreign policy and its trade policy. They are rather arbitrary and many people in other countries, espe-
cially those in the Third World and with the inclusion of Japan, have felt the problem. A good historical example 
would be the automobile exports of Japan. When Japan embraced trade protectionism in the automobile industry 
in 50s and 60s, America pressed for trade liberalization. When Toyota, Nissan and others had become strong in 
the world market, America felt the danger and started to put pressure on the Japanese automobile companies to 
restrict their exports. Having been defeated by the political maneuverings of America, the Japanese automobile 
industry started practicing “self-control”, in other words, self-regulation. The impression that America does 
everything according to its convenience, and often does things outside the context of the perception of the 
 American culture of dynamism and legal formalism is not easily eliminated. It is not surprising to note that many 
countries have the sense that they have been done in by America. In the international arena, America has not dem-
onstrated cosmopolitanism and democracy, even though it understands that to solve trade disputes, to a certain 
extent a compromise is necessary and must include the consideration of interests of the parties concerned. The 
same can be said of other international problems; especially since the days of the Vietnam War, no matter what 
view we take of America’s position on international issues, the absence of the expression of cosmopolitanism and 
democracy in its policy stance is quite apparent. As a result, the perception that America puts importance only on 
its own interests and practices a double standard, a triple-standard and even a multi-standard has emerged in 
many areas of the world.
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Kant’s international constitutionalism is the exact opposite. According to Kant in regards to your own per-
sonal affairs, if you allow yourself to be the judge, it is rather ugly. The awareness that to be the judge in one’s 
own issues is not possible is lacking in American politics, especially in American diplomacy. In trade disputes or 
in war, America does not intend to subject itself to international mechanisms where it is not its own judge. Every-
one judges themselves according to their own convenience, and to avoid this undesirable fact from dominating 
the international system, there is a need for a framework of legal procedures which involve a lot of complications, 
but nevertheless, this is the project of today’ society. Regarding legal formalism, Mr. Edminster a while ago 
expressed some sense of doubt about it, but this is all we have. If we do not resort to legal formalism in the 
 practice of international affairs, then, the dominant power, the hegemonic country, will lead as it likes and when it 
leads the world arbitrarily, problems erupt everywhere, which become unmanageable, even for the hegemonic 
power, which is exactly the situation now.
I would like to offer an example in Japan that may not be a consideration of legal formalism from an inter-
national standpoint, but may nevertheless put the issue in perspective. It is quite a regular practice in Japanese 
universities that when a professor selects his own assistant professor, he appoints someone he personally thinks is 
suited for the job. This is the exact opposite of legal formalism. Of course there is a selection committee, but it is 
only a formality that they go about the selection process; in most cases, the committee gives a stamp of approval 
for the recommended candidate by the professor concerned. In contrast, in Germany the selection of a candidate 
to fi ll a professorial vacancy necessitates the presence of a student representative in the selection committee, and 
in some cases, professors from other universities are also invited to give their opinion. The system in which peo-
ple who come from a completely different perspective and are disinterested in the outcome of the selection come 
to watch the process is well established in Germany. This way, a suitable and excellent candidate ends up being 
selected.
Strictly speaking, I am not sure if the fi gure of speech above is appropriate, as the source of the problem is 
different, but in any case, the same thing should be done by the international organizations. Therefore, the fact 
that America does not subject itself to the international court of justice has engendered many problems. Of course 
America probably conducts various activities upholding the special interests of its capitalists that are always 
 considered compatible with its good intentions. However, it is precisely in this context that mistakes are easily 
committed when America uses only its own standards to judge its actions. I think they must obey international 
law or formal law without any condition.
What I have been trying to explain is that there is no direct or simplistic relationship between capitalism and 
democracy. The long cherished hope of Europe for American democracy has turned into an excessive form of a 
perverted phenomenon in its hegemonic foreign policy in which selfi sh-interests have prevailed. Even for me, this 
is a diffi cult problem to solve. However, Kant’s international constitutionalism could offer a way out of this situ-
ation. This is all I have to say on the matter, as there is not much time left.
M.C.: Professor Mizobe Thank you very much. Professor Song Seok-Won, please.
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Professor Song Seok-Won Thank you very much. I would like to talk a little bit about North Korea as nothing 
much has been said about it in the previous speeches. When I regard Americanism and Anti-Americanism on the 
Korean peninsula, I can’t help but view the South Korean position as the most bizarre. South Korea and North 
Korea share the same race, but they are divided and as everyone knows North Korea embraces the strongest form 
of anti-Americanism in East Asia. Realistically speaking, no other country in East Asia considers it a positive 
development to have a disagreeable relationship vis-a-vis the superpower of today, America, except North Korea. 
With such a relationship existing between North Korea and America, the issue of its suspected nuclear develop-
ment program is not only a problem which concerns South Korea, but also, it is profoundly related to the security 
of America and Japan. How South Korea views the North Korean problem is thoroughly related to Anti-Ameri-
canism in the country. There are contrasting standpoints represented by the different demonstrations that gather in 
front of the square of Seoul City Hall and next to the Parliament building on Yoido Boulevard. In 2002, the same 
year that the World Cup was held in South Korea and Japan, two junior high school girls were run over by an 
American armored vehicle and died. Those two girls who did nothing wrong were killed by the American sol-
diers. They were around 15 and 16 years of age. It was truly pitiful, and the father of the girls did not know what 
else to do to express his grief. He carried his 3 year old and 4 year old daughters on his shoulders and demon-
strated in front of the city hall. The mother, on the other hand went to Yoido Square with her son in her arms. She 
held a candle in her hand. With candles in their hands, people then opened an anti-American rally. That scene was 
tremendously touching and symbolized anti-Americanism in South Korea. On the other hand, people with a 
 different agenda organized another form of demonstration at the same square. These people were demonstrat-
ing against the policy of the present government of Kim Dae Jung, a continuation of the sunshine policy of the 
previous government towards North Korea. Even though there are a lot of people in South Korea who are in dire 
economic straits, the government has decided to use too much of the people’s taxes to help North Korea just 
because we belong to the same race. In addition, there were those former Korean Marines who are wont to be 
extremely rightist. In the same place, they opened demonstrations that were from an anti-Government movement, 
holding South Korean fl ags and the American Stars and Stripes. In front of the city hall, various demonstrations 
that refl ected both support for and opposition to America presented a contrasting standpoint of Americanism and 
Anti-Americanism in South Korea. This is the situation in South Korea now. Today, between the ruling party, Uri, 
and the opposition party, Hannara, there is a range of degrees of support and antagonism towards America. North 
Korea is aware of this fact and maneuvers its policies accordingly. Certainly, America is an ally of South Korea. 
As an ally, America must be careful in how it deals with crimes committed by its troops stationed on our soil. 
When crimes happen as in the case of the two junior high school girls who were killed, the victims must be given 
justice. However, in the said case, America had jurisdiction over it. When the trial of those accused in the incident 
yielded a no-guilty verdict in a court in America, justice was clearly not served. No one could be held responsible 
for the deaths of those two innocent young girls. I think that no matter how kind the people of South Korea are, 
they simply cannot accept this outcome. That became a rallying point against America in South Korea. It impacts 
the posture of South Korea against North Korea in that a close relationship with America cultivates repulsive atti-
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tudes against the North and vice versa. In this regard, how should South Korea think about the future in relation 
to North Korea and America from now on? Some South Koreans might be debating the choice of putting distance 
from America as a matter of destiny, but this is not what the majority of Koreans wish; they agree that this is 
not the path we should choose. The reason why South Korean people do not wish to alienate America was previ-
ously mentioned in the response of Professor Brunkhorst. To maintain the present world order, the existence of 
America, the sense of its existence in the world, is terribly crucial. I think that the presence of America is impor-
tant for the balance of power in East Asia, for its security guarantee, and even in the issue of maintaining peace 
in the region. Within the region, America perceives North Korea as a source of threats and this is not an easy 
problem for South Korea because North Korea has its own agenda, which is beyond the infl uence of the inter-
national community. Furthermore, as mentioned by Professor Zhu Jian Rong earlier, compared to the past, China 
is incorporating some democratic processes within its system, and it is heading toward becoming a democratic 
country. For South Korea, this is a welcome development. We wish China to become a democratic country. Thank 
you very much.
M.C.: Professor Mizobe Thank you very much. Dr. De Prado, please.
Dr. De Prado Thank you very much. Well, both Professor Brunkhorst and Mr. Fini have not responded to my 
speech. However, I have learned a lot from the response of Professor Brunkhorst and I would like to hear him talk 
more about those ideas.
Especially I would like to talk about the East Asian community because you seem to be interested in the 
paper and you perhaps would like to know about the complementary processes of regional cooperation and inte-
gration in the region, and then connect them better with Europe and the rest of the world. I think I will continue in 
English and, perhaps with a bit of help from the translators, then move into Japanese.
The East Asian Community concept basically comes from the Japanese government, from the Koizumi cabi-
net. It was presented in 2003, only three years ago, building on a number of multi-level initiatives, some taking 
place in East Asia, and others more globally.
Multi-level initiatives in East Asia have a history of about 40 years. The ASEAN process started in 1967 as 
an anti-communist alliance supported indirectly by the United States and others. For over two decades it was just 
a loose alliance, but after the Cold War it enlarged to ten countries and advanced functional issues, fi rst economic, 
and later also social. The ten countries actually aim now at an ASEAN community of three spaces (politics, eco-
nomics and social issues) similar to the European Union pillar structure. That is much more than the trade, fi nan-
cial and other economic aspects often publicly discussed in East Asia.
The East Asian community, whose main component is ASEAN, is also very broad-based in its objectives. I 
said in my presentation this morning that some legal political institutional means are advancing and that in 2007 
ASEAN will host its 40th anniversary summit in Singapore, where the ASEAN Charter, somewhat resembling 
from a distance the European Constitution, will become the base of future cooperation in ASEAN. That is the 
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main institutional or track one process.
ASEAN countries have also to link with other countries in the region and more globally. They have serious 
dialogue partners. The European Union is one of the key ones, but the United States, Russia, India, Australia and 
New Zealand are others. But the main ones have become Japan, China and South Korea. These three countries 
are trying to create another regional grouping in northeast Asia. Actually, on the margins of the ASEAN meeting 
held in Bali (Indonesia) in October 2003, they signed the fi rst tripartite cooperation agreement at the summit 
level. The agreement is more or less advancing at the ministerial and senior offi cials levels in a number of inter-
esting, dynamic, fl exible, forward-looking functional issues. It has been advancing except except for the last 
December summit, mainly because of the problems of addressing joint Chinese-Japanese historical memories, but 
I don’t think it is really precluding the Northeast Asian countries from generally advancing. There is a bit of a 
proxy war between China and Japan to see who leads Northeast Asia, and East Asia in general, but I think both 
countries—both powers—realise that they have to fi nd a compromise and work on. So the East Asian community 
is based on the original ASEAN institutional progress now linking to northeast Asia.
But one has to realise that there is not so much a democratic or communicative space like in the European 
Union with so many institutions and committees; and the soft power created by some business committees are 
very important in the European Union. So if we come to East Asia and realise that so much is happening at the 
track one level but so little civil society movement, one wonders who is driving the regional process? That’s 
something we should really study a bit more. I have looked into it a little bit and realised that so-called ‘track two 
processes’, which here are basically track 1.5 processes in which elite academics, think-tank experts, business 
experts with research capabilities and government offi cials usually in research organisations have for many years 
been coming together on the margins of track 1 processes, sometimes sponsored by the US, sometime to talk to 
European partners, sometimes around multilateral organisations (United Nations, Wold Bank, etc) and now on 
their own. There are now actually several track 1.5 processes very clearly named: “East Asian Vision Group”, 
“East Asian Study Group”, “East Asia Congress”, “East Asia Forum”. The participants often write very clear set 
of guidelines which are being taken very seriously by the Track 1 political leaders.
This I think one should compare with what is happening in Europe and the rest of the world. Other regional 
processes which don’t have a set of very democratic or political institutional arrangements might be looking to 
the East Asian model as the European ones is too complex and with a long culture. The East Asian model is 
beginning to exert some soft power which is becoming quite interesting. In any case, I don’t think the East Asian 
track 1.5 processes are incompatible with the US system in a number of ways. Actually religion is not that impor-
tant in the East Asian regional processes, which is I would say ‘'human-driven’ and based on functional coopera-
tion in which internal groups of leading countries, ASEAN or northeast Asians, can collaborate fl exibly with 
external partners for issues of common interests in economics, for instance trade agreements, information com-
munication technologies, energy, even agriculture or other issues. These mechanisms tend to be at fi rst quite inter-
governmental but that allow for a fl exible response. They have not created very strong institutions that could be 
paralysing, so actually the East Asian model I think may be becoming a very interesting, distinct model, com-
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parable and compatible for a number of functional issues, and even better, for other parts of the world.
Finally, I would urge Europe and East Asia to jointly study these developments. Because I realise than here 
today and in many other talks I attend the European model is often being mentioned for comparison purposes by 
East Asians but without really knowing what is happening, and that Europe is starting to compare with other parts 
of the world and, similarly, without knowing in detail what is really happening in East Asia or beyond. As the 
European and East Asian models are two partially distinct models to the US globalising projection I think much 
of the world would be very interested in studying them.
Thank you very much.
M.C.: Professor Mizobe Thank you very much. We still have time, so I would like to call on Mr. Hazu Hiroaki 
now to give us his thoughts.
Mr. Hazu Hiroaki Within the next fi ve minutes, I am going to present two main points, but with the time con-
straint, it may not be possible to get to the second point. (Laughter)
Mr. Fini’s way of viewing the problem has defi ned it in rather radical terms. He has pointed out that the last 
250 years since the industrial revolution has been like getting on the wrong train. Beyond question, this way of 
articulating the present issue is rather rare on both sides of the Pacifi c and Atlantic oceans. However, I think that 
the number of people who will think the same way about the problem at hand will increase. A straightforward 
example would be the rejection by the French people of the EU constitution. It is thought that the reason why the 
French rejected the EU constitution during the general referendum is because they think that rather than control-
ling competition, the EU constitution will promote it and strengthen it to the point of excess. In reading the EU 
constitution itself, one discovers various strands of interpretations, and it is possible to accommodate various 
standpoints depending on what interpretation is convenient. The keyword of the constitution is to create a social 
market economy with competitiveness and this is mentioned from the very beginning of this document.
The constitution can be interpreted to mean, from the standpoint of those who place importance on com-
petition, that this could be a version of European globalization and a ticket to promote it. Another possible inter-
pretation is its guarantee to defend the old European society, if one pays attention to the reference to the social 
market economy. Finally though, the French people have chosen the former interpretation which suggests that 
with the EU constitution, competition will be excessively promoted. If this is the case, then the French think that 
this is not a desirable situation. In the speech of Mr. Fini, he offers a perspective covering quite a long period 
spanning 250 years; but I think that the train during the last 250 years has not traveled at the same speed. Since 
the great depression in 1929, world capitalism has not experienced at least the same scale of panic again. Why 
have the periodic great depressions disappeared since 1929? Of course, the answer lies in the occurrence of the 
Second World War. In the ten or twenty years that followed the war, there was an abnormal situation, but even 
after the war, no great worldwide panic occurred again. Capitalism has been rescued by mass consumption soci-
ety. Up till then, capitalism was driven by the production of goods to satisfy people’s needs. Later on, the capital-
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ism that emerged was one propelled by the cultivation of desire for things; for example, people buy cars not 
because they need a new car but because they like the new model; and it is the same with the buying of clothes, 
people buy the most recent design to be in fashion. The motivation for consumption is the desire to possess some-
thing not out of necessity, but because of the created desire to acquire goods. This tendency to buy things out of 
caprice rather than out of necessity has always been present in the capitalist world, but this came into full bloom 
after the war. The transformation of capitalism from a type that is driven by the production of goods to satisfy 
needs to one which is a result of the creation of a desire for goods is a self-perpetuation of the system. In a certain 
sense, this is an extreme turbo capitalism. This has engendered environmental problems and also the problem of 
working too much. There are probably many people who prefer the bucolic capitalism that came before its turbo 
version; there are even those who want the present high-speed capitalism to slow down and those who want to 
stop it altogether. I think that there are many different perspectives of viewing the problem, but what is certain is 
that the number of people who cannot stand the current speed will increase. In this regard, Americanism is sort of 
what I referred to in my commentary earlier when I talked about the unique American Christian Fundamentalism. 
While there are many defi nitions of today’s globalization, one that I have included in my comments is that it is 
synonymous with Americanism; it carries the connotation of a religious desire, and does not allow criticism, like 
an ideology or a religion. I feel that globalization has become this sort of an idea. In this light, I have cast doubt 
on the basis of its existence; to draw conclusion from this exposition, it is necessary to keep asking questions. 
There is only one minute and thirty seconds left to discuss the last point that I would like to bring up here. I 
would like to present the second point as comprehensively as possible. This pertains to Japan, and as a Japanese 
journalist who is privy to things as an insider, I thought I should include the reality of Japan in the topic being 
discussed here. I would like to refer to the Japanese problem. As Mr. Fini said, the religious desire is of course 
shared by Japan as well, and one Japanese characteristic that is rather extreme is the runaway religion of develop-
ment. A common example would be what I mentioned earlier about cars and fashion. In the case of Japan, the 
practice of shopping when a new model comes out is not limited to cars and fashion; it is also true with buildings, 
including residential buildings. Buildings and towns in this country, much like fashions, are rebuilt and renewed. 
This chronic problem started to happen after the war. For example, the average life of a residence in Japan is only 
26 years. In America, it is 100 years, in England, 140 years. Within Japan, there is criticism against Americanism, 
criticism against globalization, but America constructs buildings that last over 100 years. I would like to bring up 
an argument that Japan has no right to criticize consumer-oriented American civilization when after 26 years they 
destroy their buildings. In addition, the city of Kyoto, which has been destroyed as everyone knows, is called the 
historical center of ancient times, but the appearance of old Kyoto has disappeared. That is the point. For exam-
ple, Kiyomizu temple is beautiful, Kinkaku temple is beautiful but the buildings in between them have a life span 
of 26 years and are all made of chemical materials. In a situation like this, the level of talk should not be about 
criticism against Americanism but criticism against Japanism. Probably, I have extended the topic rather 
strangely. This is all I have to say.
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M.C.: Professor Mizobe Thank you very much. We will continue the discussion by allowing some of our par-
ticipants from the fl oor to speak and as we are getting close to the end of this symposium, let’s take a really short 
break of around fi ve minutes. Please have coffee and other refreshments during the break.
(Recess)
M.C.: Professor Mizobe I would like everyone to take their seats as we are about to recommence proceedings. 
I would appreciate your cooperation to keep things on schedule. We have received a number of expressions of 
interest to make comments from the fl oor but, as is consistent with the usual practice here in Japan, we have 
invited three persons from the audience to respond, Professors Kawakita, Kimura and Miwa. We would like to 
start with Professor Kawakita Minoru.
Professor Kawakita First of all I should explain that due to circumstances beyond my control I was unable to 
attend yesterday’s actual presentation, for which I apologize, however I have of course had an opportunity to read 
the paper and would be privileged to be able to offer some comments. As a historian I do not normally take up 
contemporary issues and so my comments may seem slightly wide of the mark,—your forbearance in this regard 
would be appreciated. I read the papers by Professor Brunkhorst and Signor Fini with great interest and although 
there were a number of differences in their view of contemporary circumstances they were both in their diverse 
ways plausible and cogent. If my understanding is correct, Professor Brunkhorst highlights a number of aspects 
where globalization is somewhat different to Americanization. His emphasis is on phenomena such as inter-
national organizations, international accords, treaties and the like, and on that basis he examines the workings of 
institutions and legal systems beyond complete American control and their gradual reconfi guration. I tend to 
regard a vision of the international order of the near future in terms of this conception of globalization or, as is 
closer to my own interest, the world system, as presenting the least contentious perspective. However, while I 
would certainly hope that this vision comes to pass, I also can’t help wondering how far it can be realized in 
 practice. At least when considering the world situation from here in Kyoto, Japan, there are clear indications that 
things certainly don’t tend to go that way and in reality it appears that the phenomenon of globalization is indeed 
quite close to Americanization. At the time of the Iraq issue it was clear that neither Kofi  Anan nor Muhammed El 
Baradai could exercise any power to speak of so that history was actually unfolding largely in accordance with 
the decisions of George Bush. Consequently, though I certainly don’t pretend to fully understand the intricacies of 
international law as Professor Brunkhorst so eloquently and comprehensively laid out, I could not help but enter-
tain certain misgivings about his position
On the other hand, Signor Fini’s position, though certainly somewhat novel, presented something that I 
could more readily relate to. As with him I too prefer to consider things over an extremely long time span. Also, 
in connection with the question of what constitutes the main feature underpinning the development of contempo-
rary globalization within the world system, Signor Fini referred in various places to both the obsession with 
developmentalism in tandem with a certain paranoia,—something that I have myself dealt with under the rubric 
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of “growth paranoia”. I believe that it is precisely this anxiety about constantly maintaining growth in material 
goods to avert economic collapse that has been one of the main features of the European, or rather perhaps we 
should term it the Euro-American world system since the sixteenth century. I believe the last commentator spoke 
very much in the same terms of this constant drive to pursue economic growth even at the cost of excessively 
provoking greed and that is very much in keeping with my conception of the character of the modern world 
 system.
This leads us to what I regard as the greatest problem in modernity, the fact that this system is unsustainable 
or, to put it more simply, cannot be expected to go on forever. As I mentioned before, Professor Brunkhorst’s 
view was certainly the least controversial and presents an eminently desirable scenario, however I would venture 
to ask exactly what power it is that drives globalization, whether or not it can be curbed and just how long we can 
expect it to sustain itself. In essence, what is it that drives the world,—that is the ever-present problem before us. 
It is here that we are forced, in my opinion, to address what I termed growth paranoia and it is precisely because 
Signor Fini recognizes the impasse and considers things within a longer time frame that I fi nd much to agree with. 
Nevertheless, I would mention one or two points where I have some reservations about the plausibility of his 
explanation. As to the highly convincing points, he certainly explains the contemporary situation well and pres-
ents a forceful critique of it. However, when it comes to the matter of what we should do as a consequence of that 
critique, there is little in the way of discussion of political policy. When it comes to the question of what we ought 
to do in terms of practical politics there is no response,—we end up with “The current situation is dreadful”, and 
that’s about it. The weakest point in his position is that ultimately he fails to address the most pressing issues of 
where the world is heading and what sort of world it will be.
If we are to proceed from the current deadlocked world toward a future one it is clear that from the view-
point of “growth paranoia” that that world will have to be a free one. This is something recognized by a variety of 
people and in political circles it has been raised in relation to the issue of a sustainable society or sustainable 
growth. However, it is only a matter of time until we really know if sustainable growth is truly feasible, the inevi-
table deadlock being pushed further back, much as on the theoretical level the issue of unconstrained growth has 
also been shelved. In any event, the failure to fi nd an answer to such issues is the basic fl aw in Signor Fini’s per-
spective, although I must concede that it is a problem that I have had to grapple with myself. As a historian, I 
have tended to conceive of the modern world system in terms of growth paranoia. However, more lately I have 
become interested in the question of whether there has been any other world system that has shared this outlook, 
that is to say, whether there has been any other case of a world system that has been paranoid about perpetual 
growth and a system predicated on freedom. The traditional world of China had the structure of an empire but 
was it predicated on the notion of perpetual growth? The world system of the thirteenth century is often referred 
to but we would have to say that, although the Mongolian world system displayed an extraordinary greed for geo-
graphical expansion, it nonetheless is did not illustrate an unconditional regard for economic expansion,—at least 
not in the sense that I have been referring to it. In point of fact I even wonder how far the concept of economic 
growth itself was developed in these cases.
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More recently I have come to think that the most pressing object of my research is not so much the modern 
world system itself, nor even growth paranoia, but rather the circumstances under which a radically different 
value system, namely one where freedom is prized as the absolute corollary of perpetual growth, has come about. 
At recent historical conferences, Asian history, especially Asian economic history, has become very popular. In 
one sense I think this stems from fact that Asian economies have had a strong impact on a practical level, how-
ever it is somewhat regrettable to note that this interest in Asian economies has been framed in terms of Asia 
being able to foot it with America and Europe in terms of economic growth so that there has been no develop-
ment of a conception of economic growth in Asia beyond the “growth paranoia” paradigm. There are plenty of 
compliments being offered to Asia’s recent accomplishments but these amount to little more than the acknowl-
edgement that Asia is now doing what once seemed to be only possible in Europe. This means that essentially we 
remain within the same paradigm of the world system established initially in Europe and that means, in turn, that 
we are partaking of merely the same dead-end.
Consequently, I have the impression that our pronouncements lack the capacity to persuade so long as we 
are unable to present a slightly different world. Given that Professor Hazama will most likely make comment on 
East Asia later on, it is probably not my place to touch on such matters, however I would like to query whether 
Signor Fini’s view that Europe should close ranks to withstand American hegemony implies that East Asia ought 
also to join together to do the same. Furthermore, I would think that Professor Brunkhorst also tends to regard the 
notion of the unifi cation of East Asia in a positive way. That may of course be a perfectly good thing however, 
when taken from the various standpoints of the people of Asia, the unifi cation of East Asia is highly problematic. 
I have discussed this possibility with a variety of persons but most conclude that it is nigh on impossible, and 
there is no-one who positively believes that it be done. The factors most commonly cited are cultural differences, 
for example the fact that Asia is markedly different to Europe which has a predominantly Christians heritage. 
Issues related to the Post-War settlement, including such concrete disputes as the Yasukuni Shrine visits, are also 
raised. Nevertheless, I believe that other aspects are perhaps more signifi cant. When we consider the process of 
unifi cation of Europe, we should note that the most decisive initiative at its inception was formation of the ECSC. 
This was overwhelmingly decisive in my opinion. Given that two countries that had previously been locked in a 
protracted war took such a decisive step to share their energy resources, I would expect that Asian unifi cation 
would also require, if it were to proceed at all, precisely such an initiative. The cultural differences are, speaking 
somewhat simplistically, things that can be left to one side,—although I expect various specialists would have 
various things to say about such an assertion. In any event, I believe that history needs some revolutionary 
reworking to be able to contribute some practical assistance to policy making, though sadly the problem remains 
that current historical research does not seem to heading in any such direction. Japan’s contemporary politics has 
become dominated by market fundamentalism and so I fi nd myself unable to conclude other than that we are 
practically headed towards Americanization.
Ultimately it would seem that Signor Fini’s conception of the world of the near future is one whose entirety 
is structured on the basis of certain regional agglomerations, America forming the central axis with the EU and 
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East Asia acting in relative autonomy. On the other hand, the future according to Professor Brunkhorst is one 
where the nation-state retains something of its signifi cance in international affairs while international institutions 
and international law increase their control on the world in a manner that is supra-national and does not embody 
the hegemony of one particular state. Well, as I have said before, that is certainly a rather optimistic view of how 
a benevolent world government may come about. The two competing scenarios offered by our speakers are both 
plausible yet I am left with the impression that in both cases they are equally untenable in practice. That is all I 
have to say,—thank you for your attention.
M.C.: Professor Mizobe Thanks you very much for your comments. I hasten to add that I omitted to mention 
that Professor Kawakita Minoru is an Emeritus Professor of Osaka University who is currently a visiting profes-
sor at our university. He widely recognized as an authority on Western history based on his research in to the 
English industrial revolution from the perspective of world system theory.
And now to continue with the comments from the fl oor I would like to invite Professor Kimura Masaaki 
who completes his tenure at Kyoto University at the end of this month. He is well known for his research on the 
structure of Indian society throughout its history particularly the caste system although more recently he has pro-
duced a major work entitled “The Socio-Historiography of The Great Transformation” which examines modern-
ization from the perspective of comparative politics. Professor Kimura please go ahead.
Professor Kimura I will endeavor to make this brief. There are two points that I would like to mention. The 
fi rst is that although I had the impression yesterday that there was a considerable hostility toward Americaniza-
tion, however today the tone has been somewhat milder. Moreover, we have been presented with a rather opti-
mistic view of the prospects for the EU and East Asia and it is with regard to this that I would like to make some 
slightly more pessimistic remarks. I should fi rstly admit that I too regard the establishment of an East Asian 
 Community as facing diffi culties in practice. There are several reasons for this but I will mention two in particu-
lar. The fi rst is the fact that China is geographically too large and has the potential to develop into an economic 
and political giant in the future. If this is the case then a regional community will not go well at all. In this con-
nection we should also note that although they tried to establish a regional community in South Asia it eventually 
foundered due to India’s overwhelming position. That’s the fi rst reason. The second is the huge disparity in the 
experience of Europe and East Asia over the last three to four centuries. More specifi cally, since the inception of 
the Westphalia Treaty in 1648 the countries of Europe have coexisted within an international system of sovereign 
states, whereas in East Asia there was, at least up until approximately a hundred years ago, a tributary system, 
—a Pax Sinatica centered on China. Their historical circumstances have been completely different. It is therefore 
to be expected that when it comes to the prospect of developing a regional community in East Asia, the various 
countries on the periphery of the former tributary system are bound to have deep misgivings. So far as the EU is 
concerned, I am also inclined to state that I am very critical of the prospect of the EU constituting a global power 
to resist America. The reason is that the EU system embodies something of a paradox; as it enlarges and incorpo-
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rates new members the need to integrate these new countries becomes that much greater as well. In other words, 
as the EU gets larger it cannot help but become increasingly inward looking. That is the essence of the paradox 
which castes doubt on Europe’s capacity to evolve into a global power. The other main reason that I would like 
to raise relates to the cohesiveness of the EU as an organization, something that is more closely connected to Pro-
fessor Brunkhorst’s argument. According to Professor Brunkhorst, the functional system at the heart of modern 
capitalism has been integrated within various nation-states. However, as the result of globalization, this form of 
integration has been seen to not function altogether well. That is the key problem with the global system. How-
ever when we look at the EU we have to ask the same questions as we did about the nation-state,—to put it more 
simply, we need to clarify whether the EU is able to integrate the functional system in the same manner as the 
nation-state and whether, as an organization, it has the same capacity to bind everything together. On a more 
 concrete level, we may well talk of nation-states as a given unit yet we see that in the nineteenth century nation-
states had a class-determined aspect, much as Marx argued. In the twentieth century this class character has 
become embodied in powerful ideologies and ideals revolving around democracy, civil society and nationalism 
and has resulted in its possessing an extraordinary power. When considered from this perspective, it seems 
unlikely that the EU itself is able to tame the forces of globalization,—at least I am not optimistic about it. If the 
EU is unable to surmount these problems within itself, there are various problems that can be anticipated. For 
example, conceivable problems that come to mind are: class-based control,—a situation where a handful of the 
elite are set against the masses,—excessive lobbying, or the scenario where France or Germany become hege-
monic powers. There are many other points that I would have liked to raise but given that everyone must be 
fatigued by now I will leave it at that.
M.C.: Professor Mizobe Thank you very much for your comments. I would like to proceed to Professor Miwa 
Kimitada, an eminent scholar who hails from Sophia University and is renowned as a specialist in Japan’s diplo-
matic history. Please go ahead Professor.
Professor Miwa I am from Sophia University. I retired from teaching fi ve years ago but I have been continually 
involved with issues such as this. Wonderful and new information has been offered today from various perspec-
tives on the topic and I am glad to be a part of this forum. I think that if I add some of my thoughts on the mosaic 
of ideas already formed, it will further create an interesting picture.
Before I talk about Japan, let me talk about Canada and Mexico, two countries that are contiguous with the 
United States. Canada is in a certain sense very un-American, and at times, even anti-American. This has been 
the cultural consciousness of Canada. During the Vietnam War, this is where young Americans escaped to avoid 
conscription. These young Americans chose not to go to Vietnam to kill. Regarding Canada, it is unbelievable 
how little interest Americans have towards this country and how little can be gleaned from the college-level text-
books. There are a number of thick American History books; a Canadian scholar checked the index of one book 
and found that the word “Canada” could be found only six times in the index. On the other hand, in Canada, there 
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is a book called “History of Canada”, which is a textbook used in college, and “United States” appears 100 times 
in its index. Despite the closeness of these countries, they have different degrees of interest in each other. I think 
that we can say the same thing about Japanese-American relations. In addition, regarding the country on America’s 
southern border, Mexico, the most conspicuous thing that Americans know about Mexico is the problem of illegal 
immigration. Here, it is clear that there is a problem of racial discrimination. It can be observed that as between 
American and Canadian intellectuals, there is a big difference in the level of interest in each other between Japan 
and America. Similarly, in America’s relation with Mexico, what is clear is that it resembles the problem of racial 
discrimination.
In a word, it can be said that the position taken by the Japanese towards Americanism has developed around 
the issue of humanism. In EU and American relations, this problem couldn’t possibly occur but in Japan-America 
relations, it is very basic. A typical example would be during the time when America, France, England and Japan 
entered into an agreement as four imperial powers in the Pacifi c Area. In the 1920s, these four powers had a 
cooperative agreement concluded under the Versailles-Washington treaty system that to create peace, there should 
be balance of military power. However, in 1924 an anti-Japanese immigration law was passed in the U.S. and this 
became a source of tension in Japanese-American relations. This is a typical example of the problem between 
Japan and the U.S.
This problem could already be seen when Japanese elementary school students were prevented from attend-
ing school in the city of San Francisco right after the 1905 Russo-Japanese war. Ordinary Americans considered 
the Japanese as sexually very immoral. They were deemed to be a bad infl uence on the young Caucasian girls. 
Some Japanese were lynched. They were murdered in the mountains east of San Francisco. These incidents were 
recorded in Japanese newspapers. Right after the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, which the Japanese won, there 
was self-confi dence among the Japanese now that they had acquired equal status with the big powers, which were 
exclusively of white race. They were enraged by these incidents. Many books were written on both sides of the 
Pacifi c on the theme of “If Japan and America Fight”. On the other hand, a prominent Japanese international jurist 
penned a book with the title “The New Japanese-American Relations”. What should be said about the content of 
this book is that it describes the trans formation of Japanese-American relations from one that is similar to uncle-
niece relation to one that is of equality. In 1924 when the anti-Japanese immigration law went into effect in the 
U.S., a patriotic group, including some elite students from Tokyo Imperial University, gathered in the Imperial 
Hotel where the American Embassy had moved itself because its buildings had collapsed during the great earth-
quake of the previous year, 1923. There many staff from the American embassy were swinging on the dance fl oor, 
These students entired there brandishing their drawn swords, blaming America for its sins.
At Princeton University, there was an American historian named Arthur Link. One time he was invited to an 
academic conference in France on America at Sorbonne University, to give a talk to scholars who specialized on 
America. The head of the conference motioned to Professor Link to enter the spacious conference room, and 
when Professor Link stood on the platform, he could only see 12 or 13 people on the whole fl oor. In other words, 
American History was not a popular fi eld of historical research in Europe even in the 1950s. It was the same in 
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Japan before the war, when there was no such thing as a research fi eld in American studies. All the interest in 
America was  confi ned within the fi eld of Western History and ended at the point when America won its indepen-
dence from England.
Nevertheless, for the Japanese, America was one civilization that they should learn from. It was the civiliza-
tion that replaced Chinese one. Of course, there was also European civilization. However, after the Second World 
War, American culture became a forceful infl uence in Japanese society. At that time, what was the awareness of 
the Japanese regarding  America? Going back to the last days of the Tokugawa Shogunate, after the country was 
opened, the Japanese already had a fondness for American civilization. Please recall the circumstances of John 
Manjiro as he drifted out to sea in his whaling boat. A kind American ship captain rescued him and took him to 
New England. This young Japanese felt a sense of obligation to the ship captain, something he could never forget 
throughout the rest of his life. The ship captain who rescued this young 15- or 16-year old Japanese fi sherman 
introduced him to his church in New England. However, the other church members objected to the presence of an 
Oriental in their church. At that time, racial discrimination was something American Christians had not yet over-
come. The ship captain could not agree with the racial prejudice of his church, so he decided to go to another 
church. Although his new church was far away, he did not hesitate to leave his old church when they rejected 
Manjiro because of his race. Although America was founded on the values of Christian civilization, within Amer-
ica itself, there are many who turn their faces away from Christ. What I am trying to say is that the self- righteous 
America-centered principle and Caucasian-centered principle, which are pseudo-Christian, do exist.
During the Russo-Japanese war, there were many Russian prisoners taken to Japan. In Matsuyama, Shikoku, 
there was an American missionary named Sydney Gurick who had come to the area over ten years before. In his 
letter to his church headquarters in America, he wrote the following: “Where I work as a missionary, ordinary 
 Japanese who are not Christians relate to the captured Russians like human beings; the non-Christian Japanese, 
compared with American Christians or Russian Christians, follow Christ’s teachings and serve the philanthropic 
cause”. No matter how much the Japanese government asked the Russians to return the injured Japanese, they 
were never returned to Japan. Finally, all of them died. Furthermore, in the motherland of the missionary, 
 America, the blacks, because of their color, even if they were innocent and did not commit any crimes, were 
killed, hanged from trees or set on fi re without trial. These were the acts of American Christians. I am saying that 
the Japanese, even if they were not Christians, have demonstrated more philanthropic spirit. This was during the 
Russo-Japanese war.
The favorable comments of such as those of the missionary about the Japanese strengthened their self- 
confi dence. However, ten years prior to the Russo-Japanese war, how were the  Japanese viewed worldwide? 
Something happened during this time. Professor Zhu is here. I would like to hear what Professor Zhu has to say 
on this incident. I think it is a very important piece of information, and an important historical scene.
It was during the Sino-Japanese war in 1894. The New York World newspaper, well known for yellow jour-
nalism, and owned by Joseph Pulitzer, had a correspondent named James Creelman. He entered Port Arthur along 
with the Japanese troops from the Korean Peninsula. On this journey, he witnessed the massacre of the Chinese 
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remaining in the city by the Japanese military. Port Arthur was an international city, so the staff in the different 
consular missions that had a presence in Port Arthur had seen the actual scenes of the massacre. Everyone agreed 
that 2,000 people were massacred. Women and children were killed as well. Creelman promptly wrote an article 
reporting the massacre and used the wireless facility of the Japanese Central Command. Via Yokohama, his article 
went on via Vancouver to New York. The news of the slaughter fl owed throughout the world with the publication 
of this article in New York. Reading the article now, I thought how fantastic it was. This American journalist con-
demned both the Japanese and Chinese military in the name of civilization.
The Nisshin War or the Sino-Japanese war, which lasted less than one year from 1894, was especially con-
sidered by Japanese Christians as a war of civilization. The civilization referred to here is the American Protestant 
Civilization, which Japan was fi ghting to spread to China through the Korean Peninsula. Observing international 
law, the war was going to be conducted in a civilized way. In the course of the war, prisoners of war would be 
sent to Japan and would be allowed to walk around the town where they were taken; this was the way the prison-
ers of war were handled. However, the massacre took place at Port Arthur. The  Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs immediately confi rmed that 2000 people were killed, but denied that there were women and children 
among the dead. The ministry claimed that those killed were Chinese soldiers who fl ed in civilian clothes. In 
Creelman’s report, he wrote: The mask of civilization which the Japanese soldiers had worn until yesterday, was 
cast off, and they became savages. It takes more than one generation to turn a savage culture into a civilized one. 
Both the Japanese and the Chinese are savages. I can understand why the Japanese army committed the massacre. 
Upon entering Port Arthur, they encountered the disjointed heads and arms of the Japanese pows were hung over 
the main street. When the Japanese soldiers saw this, they got enraged and deviated from their mission. The sight 
of their mutilated comrades pushed them to commit the massacre. However, if they were civilized, they wouldn’t 
have reacted in such a way. One generation is not enough to convert a savage culture into a civilized one”.
There is something I would like to ask Creelman. In 1890, four years before this fi rst Sins-Japanese war, the 
Wounded Knee Massacre of Sioux Indians happened in South Dakota. How would Creelman explain this mas-
sacre? With the power of 500 mounted American patrol troops, 350 Indians, including women and children, who 
were in an encampment in a frozen ravine in the depths of winter, were showered with bullets. From the sur-
rounding small and high mountains pouring gunfi re came and more than half of those Indians died or were 
injured. Justice and humanity were totally absent there. In the war of annihilation that the U.S. waged against the 
Native Americans, it was clear that the genocide could be attributed to their view of them as an inferior race. 
There were a handful of Americans with good conscience who took the wounded survivors to a nearby church 
where Christmas decorations were still hanging.
Lastly, I would like to say something about those who cooperated in the U.S. occupation of Japan after the 
war. There was a distinction between collaborator and collaborationist during that time. A very different thing 
from Iraq, I think. In Japan, there were those who championed American values and they were referred to as 
 collaborationist. There were intellectuals and politicians who thoroughly cooperated with the occupiers because 
of their beliefs. Opposite to them were those who wanted to play along with the status quo, and since there was 
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nothing they could do about the situation, they awaited the end of the occupation; until the post-war turmoil 
ended, they cooperated. And they thought that after the occupation, the constitution and what the Americans did 
should be changed. That is the special feature of Japanese-American relations after the Pacifi c War. Furthermore, 
until now, this is the same posture that has infl uenced the Japanese people in their attitudes towards America. It is 
a standpoint that while the Japanese highly value American freedom, they are critical of America’s violent exer-
cise of power. It is an ambivalent posture. Let me end my speech at this point.
Chair: Professor Mizobe Thank you very much indeed. The fi nal comments will be made by an eminent 
Molecular Physicist from our own university, Professor Sogami Ikuo who we invited to participate in order to 
provide a perspective from the sciences. Professor, given the time constraint, please present your comments as 
concisely as possible.
Professor Sogami Thank you very much and thanks indeed for the opportunity to address the symposium. As a 
physicist I must certainly come across as something of an unusual choice of participant, however, I would none-
theless like to at least attempt to make some comment on the symposium from the viewpoint of physics.
One of the fundamental concepts in physics is inertia. All material objects, so long as they are not subject to 
external force of some kind, are subject to the universal law that they will maintain their momentum indefi nitely. 
This is the very important principle of inertia initially clarifi ed by Galileo and Newton. Naturally, I do not believe 
it is possible to apply a concept of natural science directly to the various details and phenomena pertaining to 
international politics without qualifi cation. Nevertheless, when I consider the current of events transcending our 
lifetime over a very long time span, I cannot help but feel that there is some relevance of inertia to various issues 
in international affairs. For example, the theme of this symposium is “Anti-Americanism” and presupposes an 
America that throughout the twentieth century has been subject to a variety of external forces to reach the condi-
tion that it is in now. Yet despite having been unable to avoid becoming embroiled in such great upheavals as the 
First and Second World Wars, and the Cold War, America has nonetheless demonstrated an enormous degree of 
inertia. This is the sort of country that Europeans have had to come to terms with and fi nd some point contradis-
tinction, —and indeed that is very much what I believe this symposium has had as a main theme.
In relation to this theme Professor Brunkhorst seems inclined to view the global system of internal organiza-
tions and its counterpart system of international law in a positive light, taking the stance that these will gently 
break down that unwieldy inertia of America through some kind of mediation of forces. By contrast, Signor Fini 
has been more confrontational. America’s overwhelming presence has been likened to a steam train, an out-of-
control steam train to use his expression. The only option open to Europe to slow this runaway train down, it 
seems, is to cut loose somehow. In order to do that, he proposed that Europe would have to reconfi gure itself 
according to some sort of isolationism. I would certainly have to agree that in order to restrain such a powerful 
inertia, breaking up and breaking off are an effective method to adopt. The problem, however, is how this can be 
done harmoniously. While listening to the arguments of the two presenters, I could not help but feel very strongly 
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that, when it comes to debating “Anti-Americanism”, we should not neglect the importance of remembering 
where the responsibility for letting America possess such a strong inertia in the fi rst place lies.
I also listened to the remarks of the commentators with great interest. I would like to briefl y touch on the 
remarks of one of the commentators, Professor Mishima. It is now sixty years that have lapsed since the end of 
World War Two, yet we fi nd that between Japan and China, as well as between Japan and Korea (North and 
South) there remain various points of contention over the post-war settlement. As a lesson in how one should deal 
with such diffi cult issues, Professor Mishima referred to signifi cance of the German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s 
visit to Warsaw. It makes one wonder what it takes to change the direction of a system that has been propelled 
with such enormous force. Perhaps it indicates that in order to adroitly suppress a great force that has become a 
part of history there is a need for truly humane acts that demonstrate heartfelt commitment. Professor Mishima so 
persuasively demonstrated that no matter how great the historical problem at issue, we must respond to it and 
seek to resolve it, as indeed it is a product of humanity, through truly humane acts. I was profoundly moved by 
Brandt’s conduct and the signifi cance of his “politically symbolic gesture”.
One of the other things that I found through participating in this symposium over the last two days is just 
how much people like to talk. And to do so eloquently. However, it is extremely diffi cult to grasp the fundamental 
consistency of an argument in the midst of an extremely long stream of eloquently presented arguments. I dare 
say that that is the point wherein the diffi culty of political thought and international politics resides. While paying 
my sincere respect to the colleagues who have been engaged in such diffi cult scholarship I would nonetheless 
confess to my considerable fatigue and leave my comments at that.
Chair: Professor Mizobe Thank you indeed. We have come to the point where we would like to invite 
 Professor Hazama Naoki to make some overall remarks to conclude the symposium. Professor Hazama has for-
merly researched Chinese history within the Institute for Research in the Humanities at Kyoto University over a 
long period but is now a Professor within this university and has been given the task of winding up proceedings. 
Go ahead Professor.
Professor Hazama I believe that we’ve had eight to nine hours in all,—the two presentations, the commenta-
tors’ presentations and responses in turn to those comments, and so on. I think that making some general remarks 
on such a volume of discussion will certainly be diffi cult. For me this is the fi rst time that I have been in such a 
multifaceted event and I fear that in the course of what I have to say I may well have misunderstood or miscon-
strued the intent of some of the speakers,—please pardon me if that is the case but, in any event, I will not to 
avoid this if I am to keep my speech to twenty minutes.
I think I could say that the theme of the symposium on this occasion relates to a the somewhat extended time 
span straddling the momentous events of 1989 and September 11, 2001. Though I am not a research associate of 
the Institute for World Affairs and have become involved in this project toward the end, I would like to focus on 
the often made reference to American hegemony. This is something that many people are concerned about and I 
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understand that the theme of the symposium was set with the aim of considering the future direction of the world 
and what to do about such problems. In this case it seems that the aim was to analyze the international political 
situation using the European view of America, or “Anti-Americanism”, as the central axis. There were two pre-
senters and six commentators. Moreover, the views of the seven nationalities represented were combined with the 
special viewpoints of a number of disciplines within the humanities and social sciences. Consequently it hardly 
seems surprising that there was a substantial difference in the content of what people were saying even when they 
were using the same terms, though I feel that everyone pursued the debate understanding each other’s position 
adequately and demonstrating a willingness to listen. Even so, the central idea embodied in the term American-
ism, so far as I could tell from listening to each presentation, seemed to be the very term that generated the least 
consensus. I guess that couldn’t be helped given that each person takes one aspect of this enormous idea and then 
seeks to adapt it to the framework of their own specialization. As a result I would have preferred to see more 
attention given to analyzing the origins of such terminology and ensuing development of its usage. According to 
Professor Romano Vulpitta, the concept was already in use at the time of the inception of the American indepen-
dence meaning that for that time at least it signifi ed that the founding basis of the republic was to redefi ne itself 
away from Europe. It would be strange if it were any other way.
In this connection we might well consider the rise of the term Asianism, a term that came into use during the 
nineteenth century as Asia was attempting to modernize. Indeed we might ask ourselves here why there is an 
Asianism without the parallel concept of Europeanism at this time. The answer lies in the fact that Asia had a 
pressing to defi ne itself in contradistinction to Europe. While Asianism later on developed into a rather expan-
sionist and arcane ideology it should nonetheless be remembered that at the beginning of the Meiji period in 
Japan it was nothing of the sort. There was a genuine attempt to clarify what Asia should do to compete with 
Europe and the leadership of Japan at that time were well aware of it.
One aspect that was highlighted about Europe at the time was the fact that there was a common language 
amongst the Europeans, English. It was therefore considered that Asia also needed to promote a common lan-
guage and it was for that reason that Kanbun, classical Chinese, and the Mandarin was adopted as an ideal. As a 
result almost all the early Meiji Asianist magazines and journals were produced in Kanbun, even into the second 
decade of the Meiji period when the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement was at its zenith. I won’t go into 
how the same issues were dealt with in China at this time suffi ce to say that there was a broad movement based 
around the notion of Asianism.
Americanism was a term that was born very early and evolved and developed over some two centuries. As a 
result its substantive content has changed signifi cantly and today, as you will recall from the presentations heard 
at this symposium, it has come to encapsulate a number of different facets of meaning, including a shift towards 
the contrary notions of Americanism and Anti-Americanism. Having said that, there remains the inescapable 
 conclusion that one arrives at after reviewing all the presentations, comments and debates, namely that there is a 
very broad agreement that American hegemony is something that is very threatening in today’s world. I was also 
rather profoundly surprised yet enlightened by the comments of the American presenter when he said that the 
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issue of American hegemony was no problem at all and that international law was in fact something of a myth. I 
realized that is indeed how Americans can see it and although I won’t go into the issue of whether that is  correct 
or not I am reminded of Mr Hazu’s discussion of the cultural background of America and how it impinges on 
such issues.
The focus of the original presenters’ discussion was on things that emerged from a time before the nineteenth 
century, yet they brought our attention to their relevance to the present. Professor Brunkhorst’s view was indeed 
that within the process of historical progress international organizations and international law were now function-
ing to act as an axis for reconfi guration of the world in order to resolve problems. Signor Fini’s view, by contrast, 
was rooted in the basis of daily life and argued, without simply suggesting that we ought to return to the past, that 
in order to avert our own destructing we need to adopt a more balanced way of life. Though he referred to self-
suffi ciency quite often I realize that he was not using it in a literal sense but simply to underpin his notion of an 
independent regional community in Europe.
On the basis of these views we have attempted to arrive at some resolution of issues related to the funda-
mental problems of the contemporary world, using Europe and its interconnectedness with America as a focal 
axis. As a natural corollary to this some discussion of the relation between the West and the East has also arisen. 
In that vein the issue of just how far integration within East Asia could proceed has also received a considerable 
amount of attention, including extensive debate regarding the merits of the EU model for East Asia. On the whole 
that scenario’s feasibility was perceived negatively by most respondents. Actually I don’t see any problem in that 
debate however I think it signifi cant that the Chinese and Korean commentators were able to take the East Asian 
issue, adapt it in their own way to their own particular concerns and pursue debate on a number of issues on that 
basis. Also Dr. De Prado, while arguing that knowledge can be employed to supercede military force, suggested 
that this had applications in the East Asian context.
It now falls on me to make some comprehensive remark on all the varied responses to the original central 
problem,—whether my comments will be on the mark or not remains to be seen. Given that there has been so 
much debate pursued over such a long time it seems that there is a particularly need to establish some sort of 
common ground, some kind of level playing fi eld. Though everyone’s views were so diverse and there were gen-
uine points of disagreement, the one thing that I believe everyone would agree on is the fact that we all hope for a 
world of peace with as few problems to solve as possible. Professor Mishima suggested that the thing operating 
to control international relations was not morality but international law and while I acknowledge that in practice 
that ought to be correct, the fact remains that these laws are so seldom maintained except in exceptional circum-
stances,—as one person said they are essentially being perpetually violated—so I do wonder if law by itself is 
truly adequate. I rather think that after all there is a great need for a moral basis to law. For example, as everyone 
is well aware, we had the case of President Bush arguing the case for the invasion of Iraq on basis of there alleg-
edly being weapons of mass destruction. On fi nding that there were in fact no weapons of mass destruction the 
justifi cation was renewed from a completely new quarter. Basically, rather than taking responsibility for one’s 
original statements, this was simply an exercise in manipulating words to back up the thing that one wanted to 
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pursue. If this manner of using words were to be observed in the conduct of an ordinary person we would cer-
tainly expect that person to be denounced as a liar. And even aside from the issue of the weapons of mass destruc-
tion there are many other examples of where this duplicity occurs. I might even refer to an incident here in Japan 
recently which rather shocked me, namely the response of Prime Minister Mr. Koizumi to a question in the Diet 
regarding the deployment of the Self Defense Forces in non-combat zones. In response to the question he stated 
that the area that the SDF was going to in Iraq was indeed a non-combat zone. If this were a Junior High School 
exam question testing a person’s understanding of the term “non-combat” I think that response would score a 
zero. Yet, of course, in Japanese politics that sort of statement is allowed to pass. The fact that this sort of non-
sense is permitted to stand is not a matter of knowledge or logic. It is quite simply a fundamental matter of ethics.
So we have a situation where America proclaims its goodness but we have found that many of the respon-
dents today, in one way or another, have to regard it as a rather self-serving goodness. So we need to ask our-
selves whether or not there is any way to reassert the genuine goodness against the self-serving one and thereby 
win out over the nonsensical double-talk that no ordinary person would come out with. Putting it very crudely, 
the fact is that the right of the ordinary person’s voice to be heard has only come about in the course of writing 
human history and it is from there that an awareness of the need to establish a common set of values has emerged. 
In Professor Zhu’s presentation there were of course a certain number of negative assertions made, however I 
noted that he posited the existence of a core of common East Asian values. It occurs to me that if we can achieve 
some notion of common values in East Asia then there must be something wrong if we cannot establish some-
thing similar on a world scale. Just how feasible that is we might like to discuss on some other occasion but it 
seems that the key difference to be overcome if we to realize this objective lies in resolving a fundamental differ-
ence between the West and the East, starting with a consideration of how Eastern civilization has responded to 
Western civilization. In the Late Ch’ing period Chinese students came to Japan to study. As they were studying 
various things in Japan the thing that seemed to be most strongly impressed upon them was that while they were 
impressed by Western Civilization it was only so far as its material and organizational accomplishments were 
concerned. They retained a strong affi nity with the Chinese scholarship regarding human thought and morality. 
Whether or not that was altogether correct or not I will not go in to, however it is signifi cant just how many indi-
cated this outlook in their diaries and such like. They also were not writing from hindsight either, this was what 
they were writing as they were digesting the learning that Western Civilization had to offer,—and there a great 
number who found that learning less than complete, in some regards profoundly wrong. I suspect that was in fact 
a very widely held belief in China at the time. It is also interesting to note that almost none of the Japanese stu-
dents that went to study in Europe came back feeling anything like the same ambivalence.
Among the Late Ch’ing scholars in Japan, the one who had the best political pedigree and did in fact go on 
to become a prominent politician was Song Jiaoren (宋教仁). He was also very adamant in his ambivalence about 
Western learning in the sense I referred to earlier. A little later on Sun Wen (孫文) was also to assert repeatedly 
that the Great Learning, the ancient Chinese classic containing various chapters on good government and moral-
ity, was the greatest treatise on politics and philosophy ever written. The truth that I suspect such fi gures were 
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driving was the simple fact that the proper cultivation of the human heart is at the root of good  politics.
I have highlighted these things as part of the fl ow of history not simply to end up with the conclusion that in 
the comparison of West and East, the East has its commendable points as well. What I would fi nally like to leave 
you with is something that I did not think up myself but something very enlightening that I found in the course of 
reading some twentieth century Confucian writing on the fundamental difference between Christianity and 
 Confucianism. In the writing of New Confucianist Du Weiming (杜維明), there is reference to the Swiss theolo-
gian Kuhn who outlines the most important precept in Christianity as being “to do unto others as you would have 
them do unto you”. In response to this reference is made to the Analects of Confucius which enjoins the reader “to 
not infl ict on  others anything that you would not have done to yourself”. When comparing these two precepts 
there may well seem to be no difference, however when we think about it there actually is. Which reaches to a 
more funda mental level? I actually think that it is the latter,—“don’t do to others what you wouldn’t have them 
do to you”. Taking the case of America’s notion of goodness as a case in point, we see that doing what you would 
like to  others seems to degenerates all too easily into simply seeking to impose what you think is good on to 
 others. By contrast, if we consider the proposition that we don’t do to others what we would not like to have 
done to ourselves and apply it to the Iraq question then we fi nd that we are forced to consider the position of those 
who are having their country invaded and acknowledge that indeed this is not something we would want our-
selves. I’m certainly not suggesting that Confucius was greater than Christ,—what we need to do is recognize 
mutual differences and consider contemporary problems on that basis. As part of this symposium which has 
addressed the problem of Americanism head on with considerable fervor, I hope this suggested common ground 
provides some avenue for future opening up of discussion. And with that I would like to end my remarks. (Loud 
applause)
Chair: Professor Mizobe Thank you very much indeed. There were four hours left open for the afternoon 
session which started at two o’clock and so I thought that we would have more than ample time at our disposal. 
However, as we see, the time has fl own by.
I am sure that there is still much that remains to be debated however I would like to formally draw to a close 
this symposium which has been held over the last two days and invite you show your appreciation for the two 
main presenters, the six commentators and all those involved in support roles as translators. Thanks you very 
much everyone. (Sustained applause)
[End of the Day Two]
